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Abstract 
We use analytical and numerical models to explain and quantify the welfare effects of subsidies 
for artemisinin combination treatments (ACTs), a valuable new class of antimalarial drugs. There are two 
(second-best) efficiency rationales for such subsidies: by expanding drug use, they reduce infection 
transmission from one individual to another, and they slow the evolution of drug resistance by deterring 
use of substitute monotherapy drugs for which resistance emerges more rapidly than for ACTs. 
 
Our analysis merges epidemiological models of malaria transmission among individuals and 
mosquitoes, evolution of drug resistance, and economic models of the demand for alternative drugs; 
parameter values for the simulations are representative of malaria prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa. We 
find that large subsidies for ACT are welfare improving across many plausible scenarios for malaria 
transmission, drug-demand elasticities, and evolution of drug resistance; the benefits of the policy are 
often several times larger than the costs. 
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Should New Antimalarial Drugs Be Subsidized? 
 
Ramanan Laxminarayan,
* Ian W.H. Parry, David L. Smith,  
and Eili Klein 
 
1. Introduction 
Malaria continues to be a serious global health challenge that causes an estimated 300 million to 
500 million infections and more than 2 million deaths each year; approximately 90 percent of deaths 
occur in sub-Saharan Africa (Snow et al., 2005; Roll Back Malaria et al., 2005). The rapidly declining 
effectiveness of chloroquine (CQ) and other antimalarial drugs is a major cause of increased morbidity 
and mortality from malaria in recent decades (Trape et al., 1998; Trape, 2001). A new class of 
antimalarials, called artemisinins, to which little or no resistance has arisen, is now widely available.
1 
Although artemisinins are more costly than other drugs, they provide effective treatment and the potential 
to roll back malaria. However, as with other drugs, resistance to artemisinin may evolve quickly, 
especially if this class is used intensively as a monotherapy treatment (Jambou et al., 2005).    
The World Health Organization (WHO, 2001) has recommended that artemisinin be used in 
combination with a partner drug, unrelated in mechanism of action and genetic bases of resistance, so that 
a single mutation cannot encode resistance to both components. If artemisinin combination treatments 
(ACTs) are used instead of artemisinin monotherapy treatments (AMTs) and the partner drug, this should 
slow down the emergence of antimalarial resistance. However, the WHO guidelines are routinely flouted, 
given that AMTs and other monotherapies are much less expensive than ACTs. In response to this 
problem, a recent Institute of Medicine report (Arrow et al., 2004) recommended establishing an 
international fund to buy ACTs at producer cost and resell them at a small fraction of that cost.  
On economic-efficiency grounds there is a second-best case for subsidizing ACTs, because the 
ideal policy of taxing AMTs and other antimalarials according to the marginal external cost from the 
elevated risk of resistance evolution is infeasible, given their widespread use in the informal sector. The 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Resources for the Future, 1616 P St., NW, Washington DC 20036, Ramanan@rff.org. Ian 
Parry and Eili Klein are at Resources for the Future; David Smith is at the Fogarty International Center, National 
Institutes of Health. We are grateful to Ian Hastings, Dean Jamison, Phil Musgrove, Mead Over, Robert Ridley, and 
Allan Schapira for comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed here are the authors’ alone and do not imply 
any official policy position of the Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health 
and Human Services, or the U.S. government.  
1 Artemisinins are derived from the plant Artemisia annua, which is cultivated in China and Vietnam. Although the 
plant had been used for centuries as a treatment for fevers, the compound that acted against malaria was not 
discovered until the 1970s (Hien et al., 1993).  
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efficiency argument is further strengthened by the positive externality to the extent that effective 
treatment by one individual reduces the risk of infection transmission to other individuals. Nonetheless, it 
is still critical to understand what level of subsidy might be appropriate, and to what extent this varies 
with malaria prevalence across different regions, the risk of resistance evolution, drug-demand responses, 
the extent of donor financing, the cost of illness, and other factors. 
Although some theoretical literature exists on optimal drug taxes and subsidies (Philipson and 
Mechoulan, 2003; Rudholm, 2002), there have been few attempts to empirically apply this theory, and 
none in the context of antimalarial drugs. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We begin with a static, 
analytical representation that provides insight into the resistance and transmission externalities and the 
welfare effects of ACT subsidies. Following that, we integrate a dynamic model of malaria transmission 
between humans and mosquitoes, and the spread of drug resistance, adapted from recent epidemiological 
literature, into a utility-maximizing model of drug demand, to simulate the effects of ACT subsidies. 
Calibrating the model is challenging because of uncertainty over, and spatial variability of, several 
epidemiological parameters, and the difficulty of gauging the demand response to very large price 
changes.  Our objective is therefore to identify the circumstances under which large, recently proposed 
ACT subsidies might be warranted on efficiency grounds, rather than to provide finely tuned estimates of 
optimal subsidies. 
We estimate that large subsidies for ACT are efficiency enhancing in many scenarios. For modest 
subsidies, the effect is mainly to crowd out the use of monotherapies and increase the average useful life 
of drugs, whereas for large subsidies, overall drug demand starts to expand, thereby lowering disease 
transmission.  These two sources of efficiency gain outweigh the distortionary cost of the subsidy in most 
cases. In fact, overall discounted benefits (over a 20-year horizon) are often several times higher than 
discounted costs; moreover, welfare gains are much larger still if external donors financing the program 
enjoy significant altruistic benefits. The main exception when large subsidies are not warranted by 
externalities (aside from when drug-demand responses are extremely limited) is when transmission rates 
are very high (in excess of about 60 to 80 infectious bites per year); in this case, expanding ACT use has 
little impact on reducing the infection rate, since treated individuals quickly become reinfected and 
efficiency gains from the treatment externality are small.  
 
2. Analytical Model 
We begin with a theoretical model to help interpret the transmission and resistance externalities 
and the welfare effects of ACT subsidies. The model is highly simplified: it is static, incorporates only 
two drugs, and does not distinguish immune individuals from those susceptible to infection; these and 
other restrictions are relaxed in the subsequent simulation model. 
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2.1. Assumptions 
We adopt a homogeneous-agent model where the agent represents an average over people of 
different ages within a region of given malaria prevalence. Utility is defined by: 
(2.1a)  } , , { E x n u u
INF = ,  } , { M M C C A e A e E E =  
(2.1b)  } , { M C C C A A e e = ,  } , { M C M M A A e e = ,   } , { M M C C
INF INF A e A e n n =  
where variables are per capita, present values over the period, and a bar denotes a population-wide 
variable that is exogenous to the individual. 
 Utility  u{.} declines with instances of malaria infection n
INF, which cause incapacitation, elevated 
mortality risk, and other morbidity complications (for now, assume all infections are symptomatic); utility 
increases with a general consumption good x and subutility E{.} from effective drug treatments. E 
increases with consumption of artemisinin combination and monotherapy treatments, denoted Ai (i = C, 
M). ei{.} is the effectiveness of drug i, or the probability that the treatment will kill the infection; ei 
declines as drug resistance evolves during the period in response to population-wide use of both drugs 
( ,  < 0, 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1).
2 We assume that drugs are imperfect substitutes even if they have the same 
effectiveness (e.g., because of differences in access costs, consumer familiarity, risk of side-effects). 
Finally, we assume the infection transmission rate 
1 i e 2 i e
INF n {.} declines with the effective drug treatments of 
other households. 
The household budget constraint is:  
(2.2)    INC x p A p A s p x M M C C = + + − ) (
where INC is (fixed) household income and pC, pM, and px denote producer prices of the two drugs and the 
general good and equal (constant) marginal supply costs;
3 s is a per-unit subsidy for ACT.
 pC > pM 
because of the higher cost of ingredients for producing ACT.  
  We assume that the burden of the subsidy is borne by foreign donors who enjoy an altruistic 
benefit of µ per $1 of spending; the net (global) cost of financing the subsidy is therefore  C A s ) 1 ( µ − .
4 
                                                 
2 That is, a parasite that becomes resistant to ACT is more likely to also be resistant to AMT, and vice versa, given 
that the two drugs have a common ingredient (artemisinin).   
 
3 In developed countries, pharmaceutical companies price patented drugs above marginal costs to recoup R&D 
investments, while at the margin drug costs may be borne by third parties rather than consumers. We ignore these 
complications, given that artemisinin drugs in sub-Saharan Africa are not restricted by patents, and they are mainly 
purchased directly by individuals with out-of-pocket payments.  
 
4 There has recently been much discussion of the potential use of internationally coordinated taxes (e.g., on 
international air travel in high-income countries) as a source of finance for measures to counter malaria and other 
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However, for most of our simulations below, we ignore altruistic preferences and assume µ = 0, given 
that their qualitative effect on the optimal subsidy is straightforward and that the extent of altruism is 
difficult to gauge empirically.  
  Optimizing (2.1) subject to (2.2) yields the agent’s first-order conditions: 





















Agents consume drugs up to the point where the marginal private benefit (in consumption equivalents), 
adjusted for drug effectiveness, equals the market price. Note that the marginal benefit from treatment 
 will be less than the cost of an untreated illness  s pC − x n u u INF / −  because of, for example, access costs 
and illness prior to recovery from treatment (thus, not all symptomatic malaria infections are treated, even 
if drug prices are less than the cost of illness). We assume that marginal utility from drug treatment is 
declining (e.g., because of rising access costs for individuals in rural areas) such that drug-demand curves 
are downward sloping. 
 
2.2. Welfare Effects and the Optimal Level of ACT Subsidy 
  From totally differentiating the indirect utility function, the welfare effect of an incremental 






















































































,  i, j = C, M 
   is the marginal external benefit due to use of drug i on reducing disease transmission for 




INF A n ∂ ∂ − / , times 
the cost of illness.   is the marginal external cost of using drug i due to reduced future drug 
effectiveness.  A unit increase in   reduces the effectiveness of drug j by 
R
i EXT
i A i j A e ∂ ∂ − / ; each unit 
reduction in drug effectiveness reduces utility by  j E e E u ∂ ∂ ⋅ − / , because of the reduced likelihood of 
successful treatment, and also by  j
INF
n e n u INF ∂ ∂ ⋅ − / , because of the greater risk of infection 
transmission from other agents using drugs.  
                                                                                                                                                             
infectious diseases (e.g., Atkinson 2005). An alternative interpretation of µ > 0 is that, from a global welfare 
perspective, the donor may have a lower social welfare weight than the recipient country. 
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   Figure 1 illustrates the first two components of the welfare change in (2.4a), for the case when 
 and  > .  In each panel, the marginal social cost of drug use exceeds the 
producer cost by  , and for ACT there is a further wedge of s between the producer cost 
and the demand price. An incremental increase in s induces a downward movement along the demand 
curve for ACT in the top panel, inducing a welfare loss, shown by the shaded rectangle with base 
 and height  . However, in the lower panel the demand curve for AMT shifts 
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  The third component in (2.4a) is a welfare gain due to the possible altruistic benefits accruing to 
donor countries; it equals the marginal increase in the subsidy payment times µ.   
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where β defines the (marginal) crowding out of other drugs—that is, the reduction in AM relative to the 
increase in demand for AC. If there were no resistance and µ  = 0, then  , which is 
positive with imperfect crowding out (β < 1).  The optimal subsidy is higher still with resistance evolution 




C EXT EXT s ⋅ − = β
*
 
3. Dynamic, Numerical Model 
  Although (2.4) and (2.5) provide useful intuition, they cannot be computed because resistance, 
disease transmission, and drug effectiveness (and hence   and  ) vary endogenously with 
drug use; moreover, the prior model provides only a steady-state representation of complex dynamic 
processes and considers only two drugs. Therefore, we now adapt a dynamic formulation of infection 
transmission and resistance evolution from recent epidemiological literature (Bonhoeffer et al., 1997; 
Koella and Antia, 2003; Laxminarayan, 2004; Smith and McKenzie, 2004) and merge it with demand 
functions for three alternative drugs; after compiling the available evidence to parameterize the model, we 
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3.1. Epidemiological Framework 
We describe malaria transmission first with no resistance and one drug, then with resistance 
distinguishing three drugs. We then discuss how the transmission rate depends on mosquito 
characteristics. 
 
3.1.1. Disease transmission without drug resistance. At any particular point in time, t, the population is 
divided into three groups,  ; N
SUS includes people susceptible to infection, N
INF 
are those who are infected, whether symptomatic or not or being treated or not; and N
IMM are those who 
have recently recovered spontaneously (i.e., without treatment) from an infection and are now immune.
5 
The rates of change for the population subgroups are: 
IMM INF SUS N N N N + + =
(3.1a)  B N N a N h
dt
dN IMM INF TR SUS N
SUS












INF SPN a ρ ) 1 ( − ()




SP , and δ
INF are exogenous and h, a, γ, and B are endogenous (see below). 
h is the transmission rate—that is, the rate at which the susceptible population becomes infected; 
γ is the rate at which people lose immunity and become susceptible again (the inverse of the average 
duration of immunity); and a is the fraction of infected individuals receiving drug treatment, which equals 
the fraction of infected people who are symptomatic times the drug coverage rate of these individuals. ρ
TR 
is the recovery rate for treated individuals (the inverse of time taken for drugs to cure an infection) who 
go straight to being susceptible,
6 and ρ
SP is the spontaneous recovery rate, where  . δ
INF and δ
N 
are the mortality rates from malaria and all other causes of death. To focus on a fixed population size, we 
assume that malaria-specific and other deaths are exactly balanced by new births B, which start out as 
susceptible (we assume that infants have no immunity), therefore,   (results are not 
TR SP ρ ρ <
N N B
N INF INF δ δ + =
                                                 
5 The immune group is commonly referred to as resistant in SIR (susceptible, infected, resistant) models of infection 
transmission; however, we use different terminology because we later need to distinguish those who are resistant or 
immune to infection from those who are resistant to drugs.   
 
6 This is consistent with most evidence (Pringle and Avery-Jones, 1966; Cornille-Brogger et al., 1978), although 
some models allow for some period of immunity following treatment (e.g., Koella and Antia, 2003). 
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sensitive to other assumptions). All variables and parameters represent averages for people of different 
ages within the population group.
7 
 
3.1.2. Incorporating drug resistance. We now distinguish three drugs: ACT, AMT, and PMT (a partner 
drug whose costs are consistent with sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine) denoted i = C, M, and P where ACT 
combines M and P.  Resistance arises spontaneously through genetic mutation when individuals take 
drugs, and it can be transmitted to others through mosquito bites. The infected population is divided into 
four groups,  , where   is those infected with a nonresistant or 
wild-type infection,   and   are those whose infections are resistant to either M or P, and   
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7 Children are far more susceptible to malaria infection and mortality than adults, because people build up immunity 
with instances of infection over the life cycle. If we were studying a population with changing demographics over 
time, we would need to factor this into our choice of parameter values. 
 
  7Resources for the Future    Laxminarayan et al. 
ai is the fraction of infected individuals using drug i, ri is the probability that use of drug i will 
spontaneously lead to a mutation that is resistant to that drug, and we assume mortality and treatment 
recovery rates are the same across subgroups of infected individuals.
8 However 
—that is, the spontaneous recovery rate is greater for resistant than for wild-type 
infections, and is greatest for infections resistant to both drugs; resistant strains therefore face a “fitness 








C ρ ρ ρ ρ > > ,
  The essential difference between (3.2) and (3.1) is that some people using drugs who are infected 
with the wild-type strain now become resistant to that drug and move into the  ,   or   
subgroups. In addition, of those who are resistant to one of the monotherapies, some who use the other 
monotherapy or ACT move to the susceptible group, while others also become resistant to that drug and 
move to the   group. Once in the   group, individuals are resistant to all drugs and can only 












3.1.3. Mosquito characteristics and the transmission rate. Suppose ρ is the number of times a mosquito 
bites a human each day, b1 is the probability that biting an infected human will infect the mosquito, 
 is the fraction of humans who are infectious with strain i, and δ
mos is the mosquito 






















=   
A latency period of τ days is required before the virus forms sporozoites in the salivary glands, 
making it possible for the mosquito to transmit the infection; the likelihood that the mosquito will become 
infectious to humans during its life is therefore  .  Since a mosquito lives another 1/δ
mos days, 
the expected number of infectious bites during its life is  . The number of infectious 









e δ ρ π
τδ /
−
                                                 
8 Even infected people who are not symptomatic face an elevated risk of mortality because the presence of parasites 
in the bloodstream increases susceptibility to other diseases (Greenwood, 1987).  
 
9 We do not consider the possibility of superinfection when a mosquito or human becomes coinfected by a second 
strain; its effects on δ
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me δ ρ π
τδ /
−
where m is the number of (female) mosquitoes that emerge per human per day, and b2 is the probability 
that a bite from an infectious mosquito will infect a human.
10 Since the transmission rate rises with the 
infection rate, resistant strains evolve exponentially, or conversely, drug effectiveness remains close to 
unity for a while, then declines sharply before stabilizing above zero (because of spontaneous recovery 
from resistant strains, which tends to prevent that strain from becoming 100 percent of all infections).  
     
3.2. Economic Model 
3.2.1. Household utility and drug demand. We adopt the following nested, constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function defined over a period of duration t , where θ  is the daily discount rate: 
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(3.4b)   
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COST v k u δ α + = /
 (3.4c) 
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 (3.4d) 
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P P n n n e / ) ( 1 + − =  
INF
i n  is the probability that the agent will be infected with strain i on day t, where 
INF
i i
INF n n Σ = . 
In (3.4a) the term in square parentheses is daily utility from general consumption x and a 
composite good of effective drug treatments E; σu is the substitution elasticity between x and E, which 
governs the responsiveness of aggregate drug use to the ACT subsidy.   is the monetized cost 
per day of infection (averaged over symptomatic and nonsymptomatic cases); in (3.4b) it is equal to the 
daily morbidity cost k plus the product of the mortality rate and the value of life v. 
x
COST u / α
In (3.4c), E is a CES function over the infections treated by the three drugs, weighted by their 
respective effectiveness. The substitution elasticity σa governs the crowding-out effect of increased ACT 
use on the monotherapies, while αC, αM and αP are distribution parameters chosen to imply an initial drug 
                                                 
10 hi is related to the “entomological inoculation rate” (EIR), a familiar concept in epidemiological literature, as 
follows:  hi = b2EIR. That is, the EIR is the rate at which humans are bitten by mosquitoes potentially carrying a 
parasite, while hi is the rate at which humans actually become infected.  
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mix and overall coverage rate. Finally, in (3.4d) drug effectiveness is the fraction of the infected 
population that is not resistant to that drug. 
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where i, j = M, P, C ; pC is the net of subsidy price of ACT; and pE is the unit cost of the composite. 








































































Equation (3.6a) decomposes the own-price elasticity for ACT,  CC η <0, into (a) the conditional elasticity 




EE η , times the share of spending on ACT in total drug spending.  
 
3.3. Model Solution 
An initial steady state with no drug use and only wild-type infections is obtained. We then solve 
the model with drug use and a given ACT subsidy (fixed over the planning period) using (3.2)−(3.5) and 
day-one population subgroups given by the no-drug steady state; our planning horizon is 20 years, so t = 
20 × 365 periods. 
  To interpret welfare effects, we define the marginal cost (MC) and marginal external benefit 
(MEB) from increasing the subsidy as follows: 





















































ρ Σ + − = −  
MC is analogous to the (gross of externality) welfare effect in (2.4), discounted over the planning period. 
MEB is the marginal net reduction in infections,  , discounted over the planning horizon, and  ds dN
INF
NET / −
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multiplied by the daily illness cost, where   is the overall reduction in infections, net of those 
due to increased drug treatment that are internal to drug users.  MEB > 0 to the extent that the subsidy 
reduces the instantaneous transmission rate and increases average future drug effectiveness; the numerical 







3.4. Parameter Values 
We now discuss the baseline parameters and alternative values for transmission rates, resistance 
evolution, and drug-demand elasticities that are used for our main results; other parameters are varied in 
additional sensitivity analyses. 
 
Entomological parameters. Aside from mosquito density, we take standard values for these parameters 
from the literature (Anderson and May, 1991).
12 We assume the mosquito mortality rate   = 1/10; the 
daily biting rate ρ = 0.3; the transmission efficiency from infected humans to mosquitoes, and vice versa, 
b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 0.8; and an incubation period of parasites in the mosquito of τ  = 10 days. Mosquito 
density varies dramatically across sub-Saharan Africa with climate, the extent of urbanization and 
irrigation, and other factors; we consider values for m from 0.01 to 0.73, which imply an initial steady-
state transmission rate for the wild-type infection of hW(0) = 0.004 to 0.300, or about 1.5 to 110 infectious 




Spontaneous recovery rates. Estimates of the time required to fully clear all infectious malaria parasites 
from the blood without treatment range from approximately 50 to several hundred days (Dietz et al., 
1974; Gu et al., 2003; Sama et al., 2004);
14 for the baseline, we assume  = b2/165 from Smith et al. 
(2005). Based on previous data (Hayward et al., 2005) and evidence in field studies (e.g., Hastings and 
Donnelly, 2005; Koella, 1998), we assume spontaneous recovery rates are 20 percent and 45 percent 
SP
W ρ
                                                 
11 That is, greater resistance leads to lower drug effectiveness, which lowers the transmission externality benefits 
from future drug use. 
 
12 These parameters have been obtained in various ways; for example, by analyzing samples of mosquitoes trapped 
in homes or using human volunteers as baits. 
 
13 Even higher biting rates are possible (Hay et al. 2005), though our results below converge as the biting rate 
approaches 100 per year.   
14 Measurement is confounded by the possibility of reinfection from additional bites prior to recovery and the 
possible persistence of parasites in the bloodstream at undetectable levels (e.g., Gu et al., 2003). 
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faster for strains resistant to monotherapies and ACT, respectively,  1.2 , 
1.45 .  
SP











Rate of immunity loss. Although a complete understanding of how immunity to malaria arises and persists 
following spontaneous recovery is still lacking, it is widely accepted that further infectious bites prolong 
immunity (e.g., Anderson and May, 1991; Aron and May, 1982; Hastings, 1997). We adopt the following, 
standard relation from the literature (e.g., Aron and May, 1982):  , where T is immunity 
duration without additional biting, assumed to be 100 days. At low transmission rates, immunity lasts 
about 200 to 300 days, but at very high transmission rates it can last for years.  
) 1 /( − =
hT e h γ
 
Mortality rates. Roll Back Malaria et al. (2005, Annex 1) and the United Nations Statistics Division 
(2006) estimate that malaria kills between 0.001 and 0.300 percent of those who are infected each year; 
we take a value for our baseline of   = 0.0015/365. Based on the same sources, we assume an average 




Steady state with no drug use. Figure 2 plots the initial steady-state population subgroups with no drug 
use against the transmission rate (given other baseline parameters). The proportion of the population that 
is either infected (whether symptomatic or not) or immune on a given day, termed the “parasite rate,” 
varies from near 0 to 96 percent as the transmission rate increases.
15 The infected class peaks at 58 
percent and then declines beyond a rate of 11 infectious bites per year, because a higher biting rate lowers 
γ and increases the size of the immune population at the expense of the infected population (Snow and 
Marsh, 2002). We illustrate “low,” “baseline,” “high,” and “extreme” scenarios corresponding to about 
1.5, 7.5, 15, and 110 infectious bites per year, respectively.  Initial infection rates for these scenarios are 
0.30, 0.57, 0.57, and 0.06, respectively, the latter two rates being beyond the peak of the infection curve. 
 
Initial drug use and treatment recovery rate. Only a small fraction of those with infections are 
symptomatic.  Assuming that a wild-type infection is symptomatic for 5 days (Chima et al., 2003) and 
multiplying by  , 5 of 200 infected individuals are symptomatic on a given day.  Further, only a 
SP
W ρ
                                                 
15 This broad range is consistent with available evidence. For example, Mbogo et al. (2003) estimated parasite rates 
of 38 to 83 percent in different regions with different rainfall levels in Eastern Kenya; Beier et al. (1999) found rates 
of 0 to 90 percent across 31 sites in Africa; Hay et al. (2005) found rates of 0 to almost 100 percent depending on the 
terrain in Africa; Wang et al. (2006) estimated rates of 26 percent among health center patients in urban Ivory Coast; 
and Mendis et al. (2000) found rates of 33 to 63 percent in rural Mozambique.  
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fraction of these individuals take drugs because of their cost or unavailability (others use “self therapy”). 
Based on previous data (Branch et al., 2005) we assume that, in the absence of an ACT subsidy, 20 
percent of symptomatic individuals receive antimalarial treatment.  Therefore, infected individuals are 
initially treated once every 200 days or, normalizing ρ
TR = 1 (individuals stop being infectious after one 
treatment day), a(0) = 0.005. On the basis of conversations with experts at Roll Back Malaria, we assume 
that 4, 15 and 1 percent of symptomatic infections are treated with AMT, PMT, and ACT, respectively; 
all drugs initially have 100 percent effectiveness. 
 
Resistance evolution. The probability that spontaneous resistance will emerge to a new drug is very 
difficult to gauge ex ante.
16 For example, despite hundreds of millions of treatments, spontaneous 
resistance to chloroquine apparently occurred only a few times (Wootton et al., 2002), suggesting an r 
value of approximately 10
-9 for that drug, whereas resistance may arise in as many as one of every three 
patients taking atovaquone monotherapy (White and Pongtavornpinyo 2003). It is believed that the 
likelihood of spontaneous resistance to artemisinin is much lower than for other antimalarials, since it 
kills parasites much faster and is quickly eliminated from the body (White 1998). We illustrate low, 
baseline, and high values for rP of 10
-8, 10
-5 and 10




resistance evolution for ACT is the product of the rate for its constituent drugs, rC = rPrM (White, 1999; 
White and Pongtavornpinyo, 2003; White, 2004).
17  
 
Drug prices. Based on WHO (2003, 25) and Médecins Sans Frontières (2003, 17, 20), we set producer 
prices at $0.30, $1.00, and $1.30 for PMT, AMT, and ACT, respectively. In practice, the producer price 
of ACT may decline in the future if synthetic drugs are developed; we consider other assumptions in the 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
Demand response parameters. No econometric evidence on drug-demand elasticities is available for sub-
Saharan Africa; we therefore consider a plausible range of possibilities. The greater σa becomes, the 
greater the effect of ACT subsidies on crowding out monotherapies; we calibrate σa such that demand for 
                                                 
16 Malaria parasites are highly complex and have an extremely high rate of genetic variability (Kidgell et al. 2006).  
In most malarial infections, resistant mutants represent a tiny fraction of all parasites, and they rarely become 
dominant unless the host receives drug treatment.   
 
17 In practice, individuals may stop drug consumption without completing the treatment course, or mistakenly take 
antimalarials for a non-malaria infection. In either case, the emergence of resistant parasites could be increased, 
though the evidence on this is weak (White and Pongtavornpinyo 2003).  In any case, these possibilities are 
implicitly taken into account in our choice of the ris, since they are crudely based on prior experience with resistance 
evolution.  
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ACT would be 40, 70, and 100 percent of that for PMT (prior to resistance evolution) if the consumer 
price of ACT is lowered to that of PMT.
18 The greater σu becomes, the greater the effect of subsidies on 
increasing overall drug use and reducing infection transmission; we calibrate σu to imply that total drug 
coverage would rise from 20 percent to 27.5, 35, or 45 percent, respectively (prior to resistance evolution) 
if the price of ACT were half that for PMT.
 19 Combining these cases leads to a low elasticity scenario 
where σu = 0.72, σa = 1.22 (ηCC = –1.45, ηEE = –0.49); a baseline scenario with σu = 0.85, σa = 1.62 (ηCC 
= –1.93, ηEE = –0.85); and a high scenario with σu = 1.05, σa = 1.85 (ηCC = –2.23, ηEE = –1.05).   
Figure 3 shows how drug demand responds to the ACT subsidy in the baseline case (prior to 
resistance evolution). The subsidy initially increases ACT use at the expense of other drugs; only beyond 
a subsidy of approximately $0.80 (when the price of ACT approaches that of PMT) does overall drug use 
start to noticeably increase. We do not consider subsidies much in excess of $1, since demand becomes 
unstable under CES preferences, as prices tend to zero (or s tends to $1.30).   
 
Cost of illness. Direct morbidity costs (e.g., drugs, clinic and physician costs, access costs) are estimated 
at around $0.40 to $4.00 per episode of symptomatic malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, or $0.08 to $0.80 per 
day of illness, while indirect costs (time lost from incapacitation or caring for sick children) are estimated 
at around $0.15 to $4.50 per day of symptomatic illness (Chima et al. 2003). We assume morbidity costs 
are $2.5 per day (or $12.5 per episode); multiplying by the fraction of symptomatic infections gives k = 
6.3 cents. To value mortality effects, we assume a value of life v = $50,000, based on (and updating) 
extrapolations across different countries (Miller, 2000, Table 5). Combining morbidity and mortality 
components gives the cost per day of illness   = 26.8 cents.  x
COST u u /
 
Discount rate and altruism parameter. We start with an annual discount rate of 3 percent (θ = 0.03/365), 
which is commonly used to evaluate health policy interventions in developing countries (Drummond et al. 
1997). For the benchmark case we assume no altruistic benefits to donors (i.e., µ = 0 or the cost of 
financing $1 of subsidy is $1); this assumption is relaxed later. 
 
                                                 
18 If anything, demand for ACT would likely be lower than for PMT at equal prices because of consumer 
unfamiliarity with ACT, and a less well-developed distribution network for ACT.  
 
19 We cannot consider values for σu much below these cases because agents would compensate for a general decline 
in drug effectiveness by consuming more drugs, which causes instability (in practice, individuals and institutions 
would likely rely more on self-therapy and other remedies as drug effectiveness falls). 
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4. Simulation Results 
  We now discuss drug effectiveness, infection rates, and welfare effects of ACT subsidies under 
alternative scenarios for transmission rates, drug-demand responses, resistance evolution, and the cost of 
illness. We then provide additional sensitivity analyses, including the implications of altruistic donors.  
 
4.1. Drug Effectiveness and Infection Rates 
  Figure 4(a) shows the effectiveness of individual drugs over time and the average drug 
effectiveness (weighted by drug share) under baseline parameters and drug use (with no ACT subsidy). 
For each drug, effectiveness is initially unity then declines sharply as resistance evolves exponentially; 
drug use also falls at this point (Boni and Feldman, 2005).  This decline occurs after about 4 years for 
PMT, reflecting its relatively high use and resistance evolution rate, and after about 12 and 14 years for 
AMT and ACT, respectively. Long-run effectiveness for PMT is lowest, at 0.12, reflecting its higher use 
and the lower spontaneous recovery rate from the PMT-resistant strain, while effectiveness for ACT and 
AMT stabilizes at about 0.45 and 0.35, respectively. Average drug effectiveness drops to about 0.6 when 
PMT fails, and then to about 0.25 when AMT and ACT fail.  
Figure 4(b) shows average drug effectiveness for other drug use scenarios (and baseline 
parameters): one in which all drug use is scaled up in proportion so that initial total coverage for 
symptomatic infections is 50 percent, and another in which total initial drug coverage stays at 20 percent 
but ACT is half of drug use (monotherapies are scaled back in equal proportion). With more intensive 
overall drug use, all drugs fail much sooner than in the baseline case, and average long-run drug 
effectiveness is much lower. With a greater ACT share, PMT fails later than in the baseline, while ACT 
and AMT fail a little quicker; average drug effectiveness is greater than in the baseline for the first 12 
years, though dips below it thereafter.  
In Figure 4(c) we vary the initial transmission rate given baseline parameters and drug use. Here 
the infected population and drug use are smaller than in the baseline case for the low and extreme 
transmission scenarios (see above), hence drug effectiveness lasts longer.  There is little difference in 
effectiveness between the baseline and high transmission rate case, given that the initial infection rate and 
drug use are about the same. Finally, Figure 4(d) shows that the average drug effectiveness falls 
somewhat slower or faster with the low or high rates of resistance evolution, respectively.    
  Figure 5 illustrates the reduction in infection rate over time (relative to the steady state with no 
drug use) for baseline parameters. With baseline drug demand, the infection rate is initially reduced by 
about 0.08 (the infected population share is about 0.48 compared with 0.56 in the no-drug steady state).  
This difference falls to 0.04 when PMT fails, though it increases slightly when ACT fails as people 
recover faster spontaneously from ACT-resistant strains. If initial total drug coverage is scaled up to 50 
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percent, the reduction in infections over time is more substantial, while if ACT accounts for half of an 
initial 20 percent drug coverage, the reduction in infections is also higher (after three years) because of 
the more intensive use of the most effective drug. Qualitatively similar results (not shown in the figure) 
apply at different transmission rates.
20  
 
4.2. Welfare Effects of ACT Subsidies 
  In Figure 6 we plot the marginal social cost and marginal external benefit from increasing the 
subsidy (discounted over 20 years), according to (3.7), in dollars per capita and under baseline 
parameters. The marginal cost is increasing because the difference between the marginal supply cost and 
the marginal private benefit to ACT consumers is widening, and successive incremental increases in the 
subsidy cause progressively higher increases in drug demand, given the convex demand curve. The 
marginal external benefit is also rising because the marginal impact on reducing infection transmission 
and/or resistance evolution is rising (again because of convex demand) and exceeds the marginal cost up 
to a subsidy of $1.18. Integrating between the MEB and MC curves, the total (discounted) welfare gain 
from a $1 subsidy is $25 per capita; the benefit-cost ratio is about 6:1. 
 Figure 7(a) show how total welfare gains from a $1 subsidy vary with the initial transmission 
rate and drug-demand elasticities (given other baseline parameters). Welfare gains initially rise with the 
transmission rate (and drug use) but then decline beyond about 1.5 infectious bites per year and become 
(slightly) negative beyond about 60 to 80 infectious bites per year.  At high biting rates, externality 
benefits from both more drug use and longer drug effectiveness are greatly diminished, since treated 
individuals are quickly reinfected. Figure 7(b) shows how welfare gains from the $1 subsidy vary with the 
cost of illness (for different drug-demand elasticities and baseline values for other parameters); welfare 
gains are still positive at $3 to $8, even if the cost of illness is one-third that assumed in our baseline. In 
these two panels, the benefit-cost ratio is at least 2:1 when infectious bites per year are below about 45 
and the daily cost of illness is above about $0.10. 
Finally, Table 1 shows how welfare gains vary with resistance evolution rates for AMT and PMT 
(and therefore also ACT) for selected transmission and demand response scenarios.  We consider cases 
where rates are scaled up and down for AMT and PMT simultaneously and one at a time (given the 
baseline rate for the other drug). The main point here is that welfare gains are only moderately affected so 
even though resistance evolution rates are highly uncertain, the efficiency case for ACT subsidies is still 
robust. (These results do not necessarily imply that resistance is unimportant because the effect is 
                                                 
20 Even for transmission rates beyond the peak of the infection curve in Figure 2, drug use still reduces the infection 
rate, though the effect is small.  
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confounded in Table 1; faster resistance strengthens efficiency gains from crowding out monotherapies 
but lowers (future) efficiency gains from reduced infection transmission as drugs fail faster). 
  
4.3. Further Sensitivity Analysis 
  The first part of Table 2 indicates how welfare effects from the $1 ACT subsidy increase as we 
allow for altruistic benefits to donors; these benefits reduce the net cost of financing the subsidy. Aside 
from the low transmission rate case, relative welfare gains rise rapidly.  For example, if altruistic benefits 
are $0.30 per $1 of subsidy outlays, welfare gains are three to four times as high as they are with no 
altruism in the baseline and high transmission rate scenarios. Varying the producer price of ACT (keeping 
the subsidized consumer price at $0.30), spontaneous recovery rates and rates of immunity loss generally 
have only a modest impact on welfare gains.  
  
5. Conclusion 
  Our results suggest that large subsidies to lower the price of artemisinin combination treatments 
(ACTs) so that they are comparable to prices of alternative antimalarial drugs in sub-Saharan Africa are 
warranted on externality grounds across many scenarios for epidemiological and economic parameters. 
This outcome is due to large efficiency gains from the effect of the subsidy on deterring use of alternative 
drugs for which resistance evolves faster, and by lowering infection transmission rates through expanding 
overall drug coverage. However, at extremely high infection transmission rates (in excess of about 60 to 
80 infectious bites per year), subsidies may not be efficient because recovering individuals quickly 
become reinfected and thus there is little impact on reducing the size of the infected population. 
  This analysis might be extended in future work to study a broader range of malarial policy 
interventions, such as subsidies for insecticide-treated bed nets and indoor residual spraying. It would be 
especially useful to analyze, for a given total budget provided by external donors, the optimal balance 
between spending on such prevention measures, and spending on drug treatments, and to what extent this 
trade-off might critically hinge on the epidemiological and economic parameters discussed above, 
particularly the infection transmission rate. More generally, the type of framework developed here might 
be extended to analyze policy interventions in the context of other infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS 
and tuberculosis.  
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Derivation of Equation (2.4) 
  The welfare effect of an incremental increase in s is obtained by first solving the household 
optimization problem to obtain the indirect utility function and then totally differentiating the indirect 
utility function with respect to s. 
 
(i) Household optimization. Using (2.1) and (2.2) this is given by: 
(A1)  { }
INF
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where V{.} is the indirect utility function. Households choose x, AC and AM to maximize utility subject to 
the budget constraint, taking resistance or drug effectiveness, infection transmission, and government 
policy parameters as given. From the resulting first-order conditions and budget constraint we obtain the 
implicit demand functions  { }
INF
M C n e e s y , , , , where y = aC, aM, x and substituting them into the utility 
function u{.} yields the indirect utility function V{.} defined in (A1). 
 
 Partially  differentiating  V{.} gives: 
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Substituting (A4)-(A5) in (A3), subtracting the marginal cost of subsidy finance to donors, 
) / )( 1 ( / ds sdA A ds dG C C + − = µ , and collecting terms in   and   gives (2.4).  ds dAC / ds dAC /
 
Deriving Equation (3.5) 
Using duality theory, the first step in the household optimization is to choose consumption of 
individual drugs to minimize spending for a given amount of the composite good E. That is, households 
solve 
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where C{.} denotes the cost function. Following standard derivations for CES functions (e.g., Varian 
1984, Ch. 2), the cost function is: 
(A8)  {} ) /( )) /( ( )) /( ( )) /( ( {.} 1
1
1 1 1 INF
E P P P C C C M M M n E e p e p e p C a
a a a α α α α σ σ σ σ − − − − + + =  
 
Differentiating the cost function with respect to individual drug prices gives the conditional demand 
functions in (3.5a). The price of the composite good in (3.5a) is simply total spending on the composite 
C{.} divided by quantity of the composite E.  
 
  The second step of the household optimization is to choose x and E to maximize the upper nest of 
the utility function subject to the budget constraint. From the individual’s perspective, decisions taken at 
different points in time are independent, so we can solve the instantaneous maximization problem:  
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Again, from standard derivations (Varian 1984, Ch. 2), the indirect utility function is given by: 
(A10) 
INF COST
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The demand functions in (3.5b) are obtained by applying Roy’s identity to (A10). 
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Figure 2. Population Subgroups in Initial Steady State with No Drug Use 
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Figure 4: Drug Effectiveness over Time 
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Figure 5: Impact of Drug Use on Reducing Infection Rate 
(for baseline parameter values) 
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Figure 6: Marginal Cost and External Benefit from ACT Subsidy 
(for baseline parameter values) 
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Figure 7: Welfare Gain from $1 Subsidy under Alternative Scenarios 













(a) Alternate Transmission Rates
























































(b) Cost of Illness













































Demand responses low high low baseline high low high
Baseline case 47.3 99.3 15.4 26.8 32.7 9.6 21.1
All resistance rates
high value 34.0 74.6 16.4 28.3 32.3 10.5 21.4
low value 41.7 103.2 14.3 23.8 31.3 8.8 19.6
AMT resistance rate
high value 33.8 75.2 16.2 27.4 32.1 10.4 21.0
low value 50.6 116.2 14.1 23.6 31.2 8.2 18.7
PMT resistance rate
high value 47.3 99.3 15.4 26.6 32.7 9.6 21.1
low value 33.6 74.2 13.0 21.4 29.3 8.3 18.8
Table 1. Welfare Gain from Reducing ACT Price to $0.30: Alternative Resistance Scenarios














low baseline high extreme
Baseline case 73.8 26.8 17.4 -0.9
Altruism parameter increased from 0 to
0.1 77.8 44.6 35.9 1.2
0.3 85.9 80.1 72.9 5.3
0.5 94.0 115.6 109.9 9.4
Annual discount rate increased from 3% to 7% 49.6 17.7 10.6 -0.6
Producer price of ACT
lowered to $0.90 69.4 30.3 20.8 -0.7
raised to $1.70 78.8 25.0 15.4 -1.0
Spontaneous recovery rates
increased 25% 59.2 24.1 15.3 -1.1
decreased 50% 71.5 25.7 16.7 -0.6
Initial rate of immunity loss
increased 50% 59.5 21.7 13.3 -0.5
decreased 50% 80.3 28.0 16.7 -1.0
Table 2. Welfare Gain from Reducing ACT Price to $0.30: Further Sensitivity Analysis
initial transmission rate
(Discounted Welfare Gain, $ per capita)